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Spatial and Social Dimensions of Post Conflict Urban Reconstruction Programme in South Western Nigeria. The Case of Ile-Ife, Nigeria

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ABSTRACT

Ife and Modakeke are contiguous, but linguistically homogenous communities in the South-Western part of Nigeria but have been immersed in recurrent communal conflict since 1845. The age-long communal conflict was interjected by seven major wars as follows: 1845-1849, 1882-1909, 1946-1949, 1981, 1983, 1997 and 1998-2004. Our study examines the nature and challenges of post conflict social and urban reconstructions in the two communities and advanced approaches for peace building in typical post war urban areas. It was observed that most of the physical reconstructions were carried out by the informal private sectors and neighbourhood cooperatives. Naturally, cities grow at the peripheries but the post war expansion in the two communities was more in the core and the transition zone as people moved away from the perceived volatile areas. Though the immediate cause of the war was addressed, there were no direct initiatives for social reconstruction or peace building in the two communities. The paper suggests that definite social reconstructions must follow communal conflict resolution.

1. INTRODUCTION

Conflict has been described as a situation or condition of disharmony in an interactional process. Banks (1984) claims that a situation of conflict is one in which the activity of one is actually or forcibly imposed at unacceptable costs, materials or psychic, upon another [36]. The extent and nature of conflict are determined by three predispose factors including: the intensity and salience of the issue at stake, the status and legitimacy of the parties and the clustering of interests and coincidence of cleavages within a community. Most often than not, conflict manifests in violent activities and altercations between individuals, communities and groups [39]. Violence resulting from conflict is displayed in different forms including physical, psychological, social, political, economic and even cultural. From legal perspective an act is regarded as violent when the offences are characterised by *extreme* physical force or by the means of a dangerous weapon [37]. It involves threat or actual execution of acts which have actual or potential capacity to inflict physical, emotional or psychological injury on a person or a group of persons [38].

Many developing countries especially in Africa have witnessed a substantial number of communal conflicts which often escalated to civil wars or guerrilla insurgences. Nigeria has had large doses of violent conflicts and insurgences at different scales: supra-local, local and regional levels. It is instructive that many of the civil wars and major upheavals in Africa in general and West Africa started from communal or ethnic conflicts that were poorly managed and translated into cleavages of sympathizers to seek redress from perceived or real injustice and partitioning of monolithic region into conflict camps where suspicion between those *within* and *without* prevailed. From independence till date, violent conflicts in Nigeria can be broadly classified into three major subdivisions that include:

Religious crises, usually between Christians and Muslims, the two dominant religions in Nigeria. The country is divided into two major regions along religion line. Whilst majority of the indigenous population in the South are predominantly Christian and liberal Muslims, the majority of indigenous population in the North is predominantly radical Muslims and minor Christians. Consequently, a little doctrinal disagreement among the adherents of these religions often escalates to violent insurgencies and destructions of lives and properties. Political disagreements are often linked to religious differences. Example of these crises include the 1966 crisis that escalated to a civil war, the 1991 Kano riot, 1993 Kaduna riots, Sharia crisis in many parts of the Northern Nigeria in 2000, the 2011 post election riots in many parts of Northern Nigeria and the series of bomb blasts by the Islamic extremists tagged Boko Haram (literarily interpreted as 'Western education is forbidden').

Communal crises. Disputes over lands, share of natural or economic resources, disputes over taboos and traditional heritage have led to several communal crises between the indigenous populations and settlers, and between neighbouring communities. Typical examples are the clashes between farmers and nomads in Benue, Cross rivers, Oyo and Plateau states. Boundary disputes are the common cause of violent clashes in many communities across Nigeria. No region is immune from the violent clashes resulting from boundary disputes.

Political crises. Local politics in Nigeria are fraught with violent clashes as political faithful citizens are intolerant to opposition. The *winner takes it all* practice in Nigerian politics often fuels communal riots, when members of the ruling political parties often capture all the *largesse* from the government at the expense of other members of the community. These types of crisis have often resurfaced during elections and immediately after elections following accusations of riggings in almost all Nigerian elections. Politicians in Nigeria are very petty, therefore electioneering campaigns often turn into a theatre of war and most elections are concluded in courts rather than ballots.

1.1. Nature of violent communal clashes in Ife and Modakeke

Conflict often occurs when social, economic or political space is contested or injustice is perceived in the allocation of economic resources among groups in political jurisdictions such as states, regions or communities. Conflicts graduate to violence when accommodative structures break down.

When conflict escalates to violence and communal clashes, it can only be resolved through superiority of one of the parties that thus subjugate the other party, or by the intervention of an arbitrator, often external to the two warring camps and perceived by the camps as unbiased. Many communal clashes were resolved when a party ran out of resources to prosecute the war. Such resolutions often do not last as the violence can resurface when more resources accrue to either of the party. There are many unresolved violent crises in Nigeria and stand the chance of resurfacing in the future as soon as the subjugated party gains more control of political power and resources to prosecute the war. The government in power in the local, state or federal government often show bias in the resolution of crises and crises may be resolved by stifling the weak party to submission, but as soon as a new government is constituted and has sympathy for the subjugated party, the crisis may resurface. This has been the nature of recurrent crisis in Ife Modakeke, Osun state, Nigeria.

During 1998 and 2004, Ile Ife and Modakeke, which are indigenous contiguous urban settlements, were engulfed in intra-city ethnic warfare that led to the death of thousands of people and destruction of properties. Houses were burnt, residents killed, maimed and their women raped causing physical, social and physiological displacement in the two communities. Many fled the city while the Ifes that were settled in Modakeke dominated neighbourhood relocated to Ife neighbourhoods and vice versa. The two communities engaged in prolonged battle of wanton destruction of life and properties that lasted about six years. Though there was no physical demarcation between the two communities, the war resulted in creating invisible social and economic partitions among constituent neighbourhoods in the city. The ethnic-intra-city imbroglio was finally resolved in 2004 through the policy solution of Osun state government. Few years on to the resolution of the conflict, there are evidences of informal private led reconstruction programme in the two communities. The social, cultural and economic barriers are rapidly disappearing and the two communities are fusing into a holistic entity.

It has been argued that the resources used in prosecuting conflict are usually lower than resources needed to rebuild communities, relationships and political affiliation and alliances. Rebuilding is often fast and effective if there is no likelihood that there will be a reoccurrence of such conflicts. It was also posited that the processes of post natural disaster rebuilding is quite different from post conflict rebuilding programmes. Whereas friendship and neighbourliness prevail in a post natural disaster rebuilding, mistrust, suspicion and caution are prevalent in any post conflict rebuilding programmes. Government and aid agencies are the ones to assist natural disasters' victims; they often treat with caution when assisting victims of communal clashes to avoid being accused of bias.

The paper examines the nature of physical and social reconstructions in Ile-Ife and Modakeke communities and identifies the factors associated with the emergence of informal private led reconstruction initiatives in specific programmes. The paper also examines the changes occurring on the housing market within the two communities. We used GIS and remote sensing data to reveal the changes before and after the war, the spatial characteristics of changed areas and the existing spatial, cultural and economic partitioning in the two communities.

The paper concludes by underlining the factors relevant to removing social, cultural and economic partition in post conflict settlements based on the Nigerian experience.

The aim of the study is to examine the nature of physical and social reconstruction in Ile-Ife and Modakeke communities after the 1998-2004 communal clash and identify the factors associated with the post conflict reconstruction.

Objectives:

- to assess the extent of damage of 1998-2004 communal crisis in the two communities;

- to study the nature of physical repairs and social and urban reconstruction taking place after the crisis;

- to analyse the factors and actors involved in urban physical and social reconstruction of communities;

- to identify prospects for urban, physical and social reconstruction in the post conflict communities in Nigeria.

1.2. The tale of two warring communities

The study areas consist of Ile Ife and Modakeke towns. The two contiguous communities are situated in the south western part of Nigeria. They are located within two local government areas that are Ife Central and Ife East Local government areas. Though the two communities are from Yoruba ethnic stock, yet they differentiated themselves from historical perspectives and traced different ancestral linage. The crisis that culminated into series of violent conflict is related to issues of identity and adherence to ancestral linage and inheritance.

During 1998 and 2004, Ile Ife and Modakeke intra-city ethnic warfare that led to the death of thousands of people and destruction of properties from the two sides. Many fled the city whereas the spatial, cultural and economic gaps increased between the two culturally different communities, though spatially and physically they consisted in the same boundary.

The destructions of war were major at the peripheries of the two communities, in the surrounding villages and at the boundaries between the two communities. The war that lasted six years left the city devastated and almost desolate. Even though communities are spatially and physically located within the same boundary, the unending rivalry between them have had a serial historical record as presented by many scholars of the Yoruba ethnographic studies such as Asiyanbola [8]. According to Akpaekong there have been seven major wars in the Ife-Modakeke area: 1845-1849, 1882-1909, 1946-1949, 1981, 1983, 1997, 1998-2004, and more than three of them were fought after Nigerian independence [7].

In each of these violent crises, palliative measures were taken to end the violence but the issues at stake for the conflict were not resolved. The violence halted when a party ran out of resources to prosecute the war or a government seeking patronage of a weaker party decided to use subterfuge to get political control of the communities through wars and the prospect of helping communities to regain peace. The issues of identity were not resolved and usually the violence was halted by addressing the issues that sparked off the violence and not the germane issues that caused the conflict.

Whilst most of the wars between these communities lasted for one or two years in average, the last war witnessed a relatively unbroken continuous fighting for a period of about six years. The last crisis appeared to be the longest continuous fighting and the most devastating to the two communities. The last episode of the Ife-Modakeke ethnic-intra-city imbroglio was finally resolved in 2004 through policy interventions and high powered communal mediations by the state and federal governments. Since the end of the communal violence in 2004 reconstruction and peace building have been gradually taking place among the two communities. The issues of identity are gradually being addressed by the two communities and the state government.

The study carried out by Ayanlade and Orimogunje reveals that up to 30% of the people killed, injured or assaulted in the crisis were women; during the crises in 1998 and 2004, inter-married women were particularly targeted and victimized; women intermarried across community lines were the focus of the sexual violence; about 5,000 children and old people were killed and victimized during the crises; in 2011, about 35 classrooms were still not rehabilitated in Seven-day Primary and Secondary School along Mayfair - Lagere road [9]. The figure below shows a comparison between what both communities were before and after the last communal clash. The subtle social and cultural differences between the indigenous population of the two communities has been the bone of contention over the years. This crisis led to sporadic and repeated resurgences of war resulted into great devastation in terms of human and material resources and a huge loss of urban infrastructures and facilities. The two communities have been at war for over a century time in which many flash points of wars appeared. One of the earliest records of war within the Ifes and the Modakekes was in 1909, which resulted in the dispersal of the Modakeke indigenes from Ile-Ife to other different Youruba towns including: Gbongan, Ikire, Apomu, Tonkere and Odeomu [6].




Fig. 1. The study areas (the affected local government areas).

Other records of communal crisis between the Ifes and the Modakekes were in 1962, 1980's, 1998 to 2004 (the longest and the most devastating violence) [9]. The series of past wars between the two communities resulted in creating invisible social and economic partitions among neighbourhoods in the city. 166 The latest ethnic-intra-city imbroglio was finally resolved in the mid 2004 through policy and administrative solutions by the state government and the traditional rulers of the two communities.

However, few years on to the resolution of the conflict, there are evidences of informal private led

social and physical reconstruction programmes in the two communities.

2. NATURE OF POST COMMUNAL CONFLICT PEACE BUILDING AND RECONSTRUCTIONS IN NIGERIA

Communal or ethnic conflict has captured researchers' interest in the last three decades due to increasing reoccurrence of ethnicity induced clashes and conflicts in many developing countries including Nigeria. However, most of earlier researchers focused on the determinants or factors that indicate whether or not civil war resumes or to which extent the liberal democratic institution assists the re-building process [14, 18, 30, 34]. Doyle and Sambanis argue that "the probability of successful peace building is a function of a country's capacities, the available international assistance, and the depth of war-related hostility" [14].




Fig. 2. The boundary of war ravaged areas between 1998-2004.

Bah (2003) states that for ethnic groups inhabiting the same state, the interaction is frequently characterized by competition for resources, power and the assertion of cultural identity [10]. The bottom line of ethnic contestation is conflict, which often becomes violent. Conflict arises out of the attempt to include one's members and at the same time exclude people from other groups.

Authors have identified two types of ethnicity that often result in continuous contestations:

- *symbolic ethnicity* – distinguished by cultural identity and traditional differences, each

member seeking to assert its identity over the others or trying to bring it out of obscurity to recognition in larger society;

- *clientelistic ethnicity* – ethnicity becomes the basis to share common resources, a destructive force for the economic and social development of a state. In particular, ethnic favouritism replaces merit and this is used to determine what an individual gets from the centrally controlled resources. An individual is entitled to state resources because of the ethnic group he belongs to; therefore, society is divided into ethnic camps in order to share common resources.

In most nations of the world ethnicity is difficult to define, as it only depends on the importance the society gives ethnicity especially in the share of state resources that determine how the nation could be divided into ethnic blocks. There are nations in which citizens were distinguished by race rather than ethnicity, yet, being a sub racial partitioning in these communities especially if it will enhance an individual to access political or economic space at the expense of others.

The present day Nigeria is an amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorate that was carried out by the colonial government in 1914 as a fusion of predominant Hausas in the North, Ibos in the South-East and Yorubas in the South-West. After the independence and several years of political experiences and incursion of military juntas into Nigeria political space, different sub- and supra-ethnic groups began to surface within the three blocks fussed together as Nigeria. Today there are more than 325 ethnic groups and dialects in Nigeria which often jostle for recognition in the national and provincial political and economic landscapes.

Smith provided the taxonomy of *six main* attributes of ethnic community as: "a collective proper name; a myth of common ancestry; shared historical memories; one or more differentiating elements of common culture; association with a specific homeland; and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population" [32].

Communal groups whose competitive interactive interaction produces ethnicity are called ethnic groups. Prejudice and discrimination characterize ethnicity [26, 27], Young [35], Adekanye [4, 2].

When adjacent communities are differentiated by ethnicity especially by a myth of ancestry it often leads to violent conflict as each community appears to protect and defend ancestral homes or the ancestors' burial sites.

Goor (1994) on the other hand gives a typology of ethnic conflict as follows [26]:

a). *Irredentism* – a form of nationalism, which claims that a group living outside the borders of a state, region or community actually belongs to that state or

community and ought to be brought within the borders by means of annexation of the territory in which it lives.

b). Separatism - a group's desire to separate itself from the state to which it belongs.

c). Autonomy – the desire of a group concentrated in a particular territory of a state to acquire greater influence over the government of that territory. The desire for autonomy is often seen as the first step towards separation.

d). The demands of interest groups – reference is here being made to groups that are spread throughout the country, but whose members have common interests in the educational, religious, or economic fields. Such groups often strive for education in their own language, religious freedom, and an end to discrimination.

e). *Ethnic corporation* – the demand of an ethnic group to be recognized as such and obtain certain rights on the basis of this recognition, such as right to appropriate share in the country's government.

f). *Nativism* – the demand of a group that regards itself as indigenous for greater political, cultural or economic authority as other groups in the running of the state.

g). *Hegemonic demands* – the demand of one group for the right to dominate others, based on cultural or racial arguments often accompanied by an appeal for the survival of the state.

h). Fundamentalism – the assertion of fundamentalist groups that some former golden age will return, provided the community reverts to its fundamental religious values. Fundamentalism can come in the form of religious reformism or religious nationalism.

By virtue of the complex political, religious and ethnic identities, Nigeria has experienced a series of conflicts and can thus be described as one of the most divided states in Africa [28]. The complex diversity of most Nigeria cities and communities predisposes them to violent conflicts as the interactions and negotiations of limited state resources often results in violent conflicts. However, empirical evidences do not support the fact that diversity is the only determinant factor for violent conflict and ethnicity rivalry and violence. Some highly diverse nations such as Switzerland, Belgium, Malaysia and Tanzania are relatively peaceful whilst some seemly homogeneous nations are at war including Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi [17]. Violent related identities have been identified by various authors as one of the major considerations in ethnic violence especially in Africa. Ife and Modakeke violent crisis have been more related to identity than to the control of resources.

2.1. Post war peace building and reconstruction

Communal conflict can last for years, but the violent parts of the conflict usually last a for a shorter

period, a party may be subjugated, conquered or subdued in the violence and may thus submit to the more powerful party, but an end to violence does not necessarily mean the resolution of the conflict. A party may withdraw from violence or be subdued to retreat and wait for it to reorganise, refine its strategies and accumulate more resources to prosecute future violence. In such cases petty disagreement can spark violence in the future. Therefore, an end to violence should be followed by systematic peace building initiatives and social and physical reconstructions to soot the pain of war and heal the wound of disaffections. Adekanye (1997) has argued that the entire reconstruction process in post-conflict society is more usefully conceptualized as a multi-faceted one, in which military, political, psychosocial, humanitarian, as well as economic are seen as closely interwoven [2].

Post communal conflict reconstructions can only be effective if the residents believe there will be no reoccurrence of violence and if the issues that caused the violence are properly addressed amicably by the two warring parties. When a party is subjugated or coerced to submit, it may be a time bomb waiting to explode when the conditions are right.

3. METHODOLOGY

The data used for this study were obtained from various sources including satellite images of the period immediately after the war and some years after the war. Data were also collected through focus group discussions and key informant interviews especially with the residents that were particularly affected by the conflict. The respondents included: landlord association executive members, property owners of burnt houses, developers who acquired and rebuild affected properties, estate agents involved in business transactions of vandalised properties and the town planning offices.

The questions featured sought to inquire information on the status of respondents before and after the conflict and the influence of the war on their perceived status, the funding for the ongoing construction and the challenges faced by the local population to rebuild the affected properties, the ownership and the nature of property transactions taking place after the crisis that engulfed the two cities.

Remote sensing data was used to identify the corridor of active reconstruction and the corridors of very slow construction activities. Auxiliary data was employed to identify factors that may be responsible for the differences in rebuilding activities.

Efforts of the government, community leaders and other non-governmental organisations towards peace building were equally assessed. The data collected were context-analysed with focusing on the ongoing study.

4. SOCIO-SPATIAL IMPACT OF IFE AND MODAKEKE COMMUNAL CLASH

The study of the post conflict experiences between two communities revealed that the war of 1998-2004 still has noticeable imprints on the properties, streets, social infrastructures, interpersonal relationships between the two communities and obvious caution and disdain to the opposing communities when issues are being discussed.

These are evident in the relics of burnt and abandoned buildings and infrastructures such as: schools, clinics and police posts within the two communities.




Fig. 3. Major hot spots during the 1998-2004 Ife Modakeke War.

Specifically, the areas identified by most residents who witnessed the war as the theatre of war is the Akarabata Area that consists primarily of three short streets known as Lines 1, 2 and 3. This boundary part of the city was claimed by the two communities and was completely destroyed during the war.

Other areas that experienced similar fate were the Sijuade Estate and Oke Yidi areas, which were destroyed as reprisal by the Modakekes over the attacks on their properties by the Ifes. Other areas identified by residents as highly devastated during the war were areas close to locations where the two warring foot soldiers engaged themselves at violent confrontations. Evidences of these are the bullet holes on the buildings, such neighbourhoods becoming desolate. These areas include Oke Eso, Oke Isale Agbara and residential areas along Ondo road.

4.1. Physical reconstruction in the two warring communities

Reconstruction in Modakeke neighbourhoods. The study shows that physical reconstructions are generally very slow in Modakeke region mainly because most properties destroyed here belong to Ifes and therefore there is still a fear of reoccurrence of war. The areas affected by this slow reconstruction include: Sijuade Estate, Ondo road, Oscas area as shown in Figure 3. Other areas include: Akarabata Lines 1, 2 and 3, Oke Yidi and the residential enclaves along Ondo road (see Figure 3).




Fig. 4. Spatial distribution of urban reconstruction after the war in Ife-Modakeke area.

The reconstruction rate was slow due to the ownership of these structures belongs to the opponent community; therefore there are fears of reoccurrence of insurgence if such properties are rebuilt. On the other hand most of these neighbourhoods ensure that the owners of such properties sell them to indigenous members of the neighbourhoods who, after buying the properties at ridiculous prices, do not have the resources to renovate the properties to modern status.

Reconstruction in Ife neighbourhoods. On the other hand, urban reconstruction is very fast in Ife areas and mostly in the commercial precincts of the community. The active areas for reconstruction include Lagere road, Ibadan road, Ede road in Ife LGA where the commercial value of the properties have sky rocketed because of its location across the primary travel route across the city centre. Along this route, the percentage of properties not yet rebuilt after the war is highly insignificant.

4. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

Security rebuilding. The security and military solutions were initiated by the federal government through the establishment of Police training school and the creation of several police posts and police stations in the two communities. However, there was no formal disarmament programme after the war, therefore most of the weapons used to prosecute the war are still in the hands of the civilians and could trigger other forms of security challenges in the near future including violent armed robberies. Violent bank robberies have been reported at different times after the crisis. Insecurity is also rampant in the residential neighbourhoods especially at the border neighbourhoods, but residents associations have risen to the challenge through different orthodox and unorthodox approaches to combat criminality. Some of these strategies for crime control in the neighbourhoods include: road enclosures through gates, cross bars and booms. Neighbourhood watch is also commonly practised in these areas to stem the increasing wave of criminality in the neighbourhood especially at night.

Political solution and rebuilding programme. The political imbroglio was resolved by the state government through the creation of development council area for the Modakeke community and its environs. The resource allocation accruing to Ife central Local Government is shared between the two administrative units and indigenous personnel were appointed to manage the two administrative subunits. The identity crisis was addressed through the formal installation of the traditional ruler of Modakeke to the status of an Oba (King) from the previous status of Bale (Quarters chief) in September 5th, 2009 by the Osun state government [33]. Though the coronation of the Oba Ogunsuwa of Modakeke gave some form of autonomy to the community and was expected to resolve the problems of identity, the follow up actions which included the promotion and installation of many other quarter chiefs in Ile Ife to the status of Obas could erode the gains the two communities have achieved. All the installed kings in Ife kingdom, including the Oba of Modakeke are expected to respect and pay respect to the Ooni of Ife, (the paramount ruler Ife kingdom). The political and identity issues and challenges that culminated into previous violent conflicts should have been addressed through the traditional institutional arrangement, however, the relationship between the indigenous population of the two communities is still one of caution and rather frosty.

Psychosocial and humanitarian rebuilding. There were no concrete programmes to address the mind-set of the indigenous population in the two communities especially those that are directly or remotely affected by the war to show forgiveness and reconciliation. There are wounds unattended, damages uncompensated, and cries that could not be consoled among individuals within the two communities. It was reported that some programmes were initiated to compensate the victims of the war in 2005 but the process was hijacked by the politicians who wanted their patrons and supporters to use the opportunity to benefit from, therefore the process being discontinued. In the final analysis majority of the victims or families of the dead victims were not compensated and a large number of them chose to relocate from the town and some relocated to perceive more secure places in the city. The war affected mostly the boundaries between the two contiguous communities and the peripheral regions of the communities. There were exoduses of developers from the periphery to the core, therefore making properties in the transition zone very costly. Modakeke people that built in neighbourhoods dominated by the Ifes sold off their properties and move to Modakeke to build and vice versa. Each of the two communities believed they suffered more during the war and counted more losses, but there is no study on the value of losses among the two communities. Many of the non residents and the new arrived believe the conflict is over, but some indigenous population still believe there are future wars unless issues at stake are fully resolved, especially in case of identity. The reconciliation and peace building process is not complete and though the current peace my last for a while, the peace building process put in place is neither foolproof nor sustainable. A number of non-governmental organisations were initially involved in reconciliation programmes immediately after the ceasefire, but they eventually abandoned the neighbourhoods largely due to lack of funds, while the religious organisations and resident associations continued the peace building process, yet through informal and unsystematic mechanisms.

Urban physical and economic rebuilding. Some of the important factors in the process of reconstruction and repairing infrastructure after conflict are: restoring a sense of security, letting the past go, freedom from vengeful actions and building broken relationships.



Fig. 5. Area of active reconstruction in Ile Ife (*red spots show reconstructed buildings*).

Peace have once again returned to Ife-Modakeke after their disputes were resolved, but despite the resolution the rate of reconstruction of damaged properties has been rather slow except for areas like Ibadan Road Apata, and Olugbodo. Almost all the respondents from the field surveys stated the fact that the major challenge resulting in the slow pace of post construction is the fear of conflict relapse.



Fig. 6. Area of slow reconstruction activities in Modakeke (*red spots show renovated buildings*).

It is very obvious that the two communities have not let go of the past. This is noticeable in the refusal of indigenes that were staying at the boundaries of the community to reconstruct their damaged properties afraid of what would happen if the war broke out again. Some abandoned properties belong to people who were killed during the conflicts and many nonindigenes also fled the cities leaving their properties behind, which are still very obvious till date in areas like: Akrabata, Akrabata line I-III, Isale Agbara, Egbedore, Odo-okun, OSCAS estate, Oke-eso, Ita-Agbon.

The major factors responsible for faster reconstruction activities in areas like Ibadan road area, Apata I-III and Olugbodo estate are the bought over situations in those areas (mostly for commercial purposes) and the effort of the Landlord Association enforcing the owners to either repair or sell their buildings in order to prevent the abandoned buildings to become hide outs for criminals.

Inadequate funds were noticed to be one of the major factors responsible for the slow pace of reconstruction in the neighbourhoods of the two communities. There is no provision for mortgage loan, there is little or no government and community based organization participation in the reconstruction exercise. The respondents were not aware of any efforts of both government and CBO assistance for residence during and after the crisis in relation to property reconstruction. The few reconstructions were done by individual owners, assisted by their friends, family members and religious/welfare associations.

Urban reconstruction in Ile-Ife. Reconstruction programme is generally high in Ife as compared to Modakeke. The areas where active reconstruction activities are taking place in Ile-Ife include: Lagere, Mayfair and Seven Day Adventist area.

A critical analysis of the territorial differences in the places where active reconstructions are taking place and those areas where reconstructions programmes are very slow clearly indicate the following reconstruction precincts:

a). Commercial enterprises. Most of the buildings on the May fair –Lagere road are of commercial use or a mixture of residential and commercial, 87.2% of the buildings that have been renovated or in the process of being renovated are those whose ownership have changed and the new owners sized the opportunity of low values of these property to purchase and renovate. It was observed that most of the owners were either dead or did not have the financial means to rebuild the properties hence they sold them at very low price. All the new owners on the major roads are converting their properties to commercial purposes including offices, shops and warehouses.

The areas in Ile-Ife where the construction exercises are very slow are basically residential, where most of the residents have relocated, been killed or lacked in the financial means to renovate or rebuild the damaged properties. Some of these properties are damaged beyond repairs, and they would require complete demolition and rebuilding in order to make the building habitable.

The responses from the respondents in affected neighbourhoods indicated that most of the affected families are unwilling to return to the previous occupation, whereas some have been destabilised economically on a permanent basis that they could not possibly rebuild their properties.

These properties are also not of high commercial value for the interested new arrivals who will like to acquire these properties in the residential core areas.

The property market in Nigeria is fraught with a lot of irregularities; therefore, property buyers are wary to deal with buildings whose owners could not be ascertained or dead, leaving behind a number of relatives laying claims to ownership of such properties, most of these properties also belonging to the extended families. Some of the properties in the slow areas are also owned by extended families, their ownership being still contested by many family members; therefore they could not be rebuilt. A number of properties were found already collapsing and some being hide-outs for people of questionable characters. Only about 36.8% of the interviewed people believed that the crisis may not reoccur based on the peace building programmes initiated by the government and the traditional institutions in the two communities. However, judging from the past conflicts in the area and the approach used by the government of the day to resolving the issues that trigger the crisis, it is unlikely that the crisis may not reoccur as the process of interactions and interactive dealing can still open up old wounds.

Most of the residents are very cautious in the rebuilding operations while the indigenous populations

are moving away from the boundary areas to perceived secure locations in the core areas.

b). Urban reconstructions in Modakeke. Urban reconstruction in the Modakeke areas are generally very slow (see fig. 3), some of the buildings were burnt and damaged by Modakeke people because they were properties of people from Ile-Ife. Most of these properties are still lying desolate mainly because the Ile-Ife indigenes could not summon courage to rebuild their properties and some of these properties do not hold any commercial values as they are largely located in residential areas. The area along Ondo road, Oke yidi area and other areas in the boundary areas and core of Modakeke are still left un-rebuilt.

This is an indication that the crisis might have abated as a result of lack of resources to prosecute more wars and not because the issues of conflict have been finally resolved.

The issues that caused the violence in 1998 were just a surrogate of a deep seated conflict and differences between the two communities that accounted for repeated occurrence of violence. In 1983 Modakeke was renamed as South of Ife and this triggered violent conflicts that resulted in loss of lives. The renaming exercise was withdrawn for the sake of peace, though the violence abated, the differences between the two communities deepened. The federal government created a local government out of Ife and joined it with Ife North with headquarter at Ipetumodu. However in 1996 it was relocated in Ife Central, which sparked the crisis of 1998 that lasted for six years. The reconstruction activities are very rapid in areas where residents believe the crisis may not reoccur again than in the neighbourhood where residents believe there would be another reoccurrence of violence. The growth in housing market is largely facilitated by private led initiatives and communal effort contributions to reconstruction by communal social groups have motivated community development programmes and how these activities have resulted in the physical rebuild and re-occupation of abandoned buildings and war sacked areas of the communities.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Though the social, cultural and economic barriers appears to be rapidly disappearing and the two communities are re-emerging as economically vibrant entities with re-engineered social and economic drives, the evidence on ground suggest potential relapse of the communities into violence conflicts in the future. There are no government sponsored initiatives for physical and social rebuilding in the affected neighbourhoods, but the community associations and cooperative societies are actively harnessing social capital for rebuilding in the affected neighbourhoods.

In order to forestall the repeated occurrence of the conflict situation in Ile-Ife and Modakeke as well as other warring communities in Nigeria, the process of social and physical reconstruction should be completed and followed through by the state and nongovernmental actors. Global and regional agencies should focus more on the rehabilitation and rebuilding processes as part of peace keeping activities and address all internally displaced people through a pragmatic social and physical reconstruction. Cities in transitions where violence and corruption prevails can also be addressed through social reconstruction, through injections of resources for building community values and social cohesion. The twenty first century cities are far from the picture of anomie where urban dwellers relate as strangers and engage in business like contact. There are supra-local communities in the form of religion, profession, ethnicity or culture that bind urban dwellers together where community values are upheld and can be used to build social cohesion and reconstruct disrupted social conditions. Conteh-Morgan (2005) argues that human security at the personal, institutional and structural-cultural levels can be more effectively realized in the process of peace building programmes if, among other things, culture, identity and an interpretive bottom-up approach to peace building are taken into account when addressing the problems of individuals, groups, and communities. It is important that the material as well as socio-cultural contexts of the issues that led to the conflict be considered and attended to in the peace building programmes.

In order to ensure lasting peace in any warring communities, the reconstructions should go beyond the conventional peace building through compensational and distributions of relief materials, but must include programmes and initiatives that address the root causes of conflict, restore confidence and heal negative effects of perceived injustices or marginalisation.

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